fiercely or strenuously they should be opposed. Tolerance for the intolerable means that those who are disgruntled, objectionable and mean-spirited will offend us, including and especially those who are vulnerable, sensitive or fearful. Yet it is unavoidable that expressive freedom can only thrive when judgment of its exercise is suspended. Rather than condemn society to a fate of unrequited conflict and darkness, an open process of freedom is a mark of progress and a testament to democracy's essential humility. 2 Though the temptation to judge the message must be suspended, freedom is not absolute and nor is judgment absolutely suspended. The exercise of freedom can be judged and is subject to limits when it causes harm. In the case of expressive activity the link to harm can be difficult to show because words and opinions are more likely to change attitudes and influence views than to prompt immediate or violent action. That is why it is no easy task to pinpoint the moment when expression crosses the line and is no longer free because it has become dangerous enough to prohibit. When controversial or unpopular expression was at stake under the Charter, the Supreme Court adopted a risk-averse approach and invariably chose limits on expression over freedom. The question that s.2(b)'s early legacy raises is whether restrictions were upheld because harm was shown, or because expression like hate propaganda, obscenity and pornography, child pornography, tobacco advertising, defamation, and discriminatory messages offend mainstream sensibilities. This legacy leaves unclear whether freedom of expression is stronger than it was before the Charter.
Meanwhile, the relative insignificance of freedom of the press in this period raises other concerns. It is puzzling that there have only been a few Supreme Court decisions on the press, and troubling that it remains uncertain whether freedom of the press is an independent entitlement, with distinctive content, or is subsumed in expressive freedom. This jurisprudence, which is modest by any standard, pivots on the Charter status of newsgathering. At key moments in s.2(b)'s formative period the Court not only refused to grant this core function constitutional status but in doing so skirted s.2(b) altogether.
Engaging the guarantee is an obvious first step in granting the press protection under the Charter.
If the Supreme Court's early jurisprudence has not met expectations, still it should not be viewed as an unvarnished disappointment. There is a crowning achievement in the first thirty years of the Charter, and that is the open justice principle. With little hesitation, the Supreme Court adopted a confident and vigilant approach to measures that excluded the press and public from judicial proceedings or imposed publication bans to prohibit reporters and others from disclosing information learned in such proceedings. The press played a leading role in developing this constitutional concept of transparency, which is distinctive because it blends s.2(b)'s twin expression and press guarantees together. The
Charter jurisprudence on open justice stands apart but should not be thought of as singular; to the contrary, the Supreme Court's approach to open justice offers a model for all of s.2(b).
The Charter's thirtieth anniversary is a checkpoint, an opportunity to take stock of s.2(b)'s journey to date. Though a broader reflection would examine the Supreme Court's conception of fundamental freedoms -including freedom of religion, assembly and association, as well as expression and the press -the focus here is on freedom of the press. A short introduction to expressive freedom under the Charter provides a preface to that discussion. In turning to the press, the central concern which emerges is the Supreme Court's avoidance of s.2(b) and its reluctance to grant newsgathering activities status under the Charter. Insisting that the press can be protected in other ways is unconvincing in the face of the Court's unwillingness to engage the Charter's explicit guarantee of a free press. At the same time and as noted, the open justice principle muddles this narrative by providing a shining example of s.2(b)'s promise. By demonstrating how the guarantee's freedoms can be protected when expression and the press work in tandem, the open justice jurisprudence to some extent offsets the newsgathering cases. Looking to the future, the Supreme Court should harmonize the disparate strands of the s.2(b) jurisprudence and, in particular, should apply the open justice methodology to questions of expressive and press freedom. As for the press, two obstacles stand in the way of robust protection for this freedom: one is theoretical and calls for a concept that explains the constitutional status of the press; the other is definitional and as such seeks a conceptual answer to the challenge of identifying who the press is at this moment in time. Addressing these obstacles will not only enable but also require the Supreme Court to protect the press and its newsgathering activities under s.2(b). If and when that happens, the status of the press under s.2(b) should be much improved at the Charter's next checkpoint.
II. Freedom of expression: a seesaw of rights and limits
Freedom of expression is the dominant force in the s.2(b) jurisprudence, and interpreting that guarantee has been the Supreme Court's primary concern since 1982. Meanwhile, it has not been well understood that freedom of the press is an independent guarantee, and perhaps for that reason the Court's concept of this entitlement is not well developed. Despite the asymmetry between s.2(b)'s two clauses, a scan of expressive freedom under the Charter can offer insight into the Court's view of the press. 3 In considering expressive freedom, the Supreme Court adopted a definition of the right that is beyond reproach, and then turned away from it in upholding restrictions on expressive activities. In like manner, and despite supporting the role of a free press in democratic governance, the Court has refused to engage the press guarantee under s.2(b).
In the space of thirty years the Supreme Court has embedded a fundamentally ambivalent conception of expressive freedom in the jurisprudence. 
III. The press, newsgathering, and the Charter
The Supreme Court's press jurisprudence has two branches: while one deals with issues that relate exclusively to the press, the other addresses questions that involve overlap between press and expressive freedom. While the Court supported the entitlement when the two were joined in the open justice setting, it was more reluctant to do so when newsgathering was at stake on its own. 11 That question was squarely posed on two occasions, several years apart. In 1991, the CBC sought relief under the Charter from search warrants seeking access to film footage that belonged to the broadcaster.
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Then in 2010, reporters from two national newspapers claimed a privilege to protect the identity of confidential newsgathering sources. 13 Both times the Court proclaimed its support for a free press but refused to engage s.2(b).
The 1991 search warrant cases gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to address the Charter status of the press. At different times and places the CBC had attended demonstrations to gather news and report these events to the public. To advance their investigation, law enforcement officers sought access to the CBC's newsgathering material after the fact, which included raw footage as well as clips that had been broadcast. In challenging the warrants, the CBC maintained that the warrants violated its rights under s.2(b) and argued that to protect the integrity of newsgathering the threshold had to be substantially raised in the case of any search of the press. 11 The law of defamation also engages expressive freedom and press interests, and though it is beyond the scope of this Article it is worth noting that there, as well, the Supreme Court rejected a Charter solution in re-thinking the way the common law balances the protection of reputation against expressive and press freedom. The Supreme Court did not hesitate to acknowledge the vital role of a free press and its connection to democratic governance. 14 But rather than address the constitutionality of the warrants under s.2(b) it deflected the issue to s.8 of the Charter, which prohibits unreasonable search or seizure. 15 Doing so enabled the judges to diffuse the direct violation of press rights and re-cast it under s.8, where it could be treated in much the same way as any other search. Instead of making the warrants contingent on conditions or requirements being met, the Court identified press-specific variables that should be taken into account to determine the reasonableness of the search. 16 In upholding the search warrants in both cases, the Court held that the CBC's newsgathering was not compromised, in large part because the footage had already been broadcast and the CBC therefore could not claim that the material was private or confidential. 17 In such circumstances, the CBC had no further legitimate interest in withholding this footage, and its refusal to release it to the police accordingly constituted an unreasonable demand for accommodation.
14 See e.g. New Brunswick, supra, note 12, at 475 (stating that the media "have a vitally important role to play in democratic society" and that it is the media which, "by gathering and disseminating news, enable members of our society to make an informed assessment of the issues which may significantly affect their lives and well-being").
15 Section 8 states: "Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure"; Charter, supra¸note 1. 16 The Court generated a checklist of nine variables, four of which reference the circumstances of the press: the first indicates the need to balance the demands of law enforcement against the privacy rights of the press; the second considers whether the information is available from other sources and whether reasonable efforts to obtain it have been taken and exhausted; the third indicates that the warrant will generally be available when the information has been disseminated; and the fourth states that any search of premises should minimize the interference with press operations. New Brunswick, supra, note 12, at 481.
Only one member of the Court realized what was at stake and spoke up for freedom of the press. 18 Justice McLachlin J., who is now the Chief Justice of Canada, wrote a dissent which held that the state's interference with newsgathering activities violated s.2(b) and could not be deflected to s.8 and its criteria for reasonable search. McLachlin J. gave a vigorous account of press freedom in Canada, recognized that it is the prospect of interference with newsgathering that creates a chilling effect on the press function, and rejected the suggestion that the press and public should be governed by the same standards for search. 19 To protect newsgathering she proposed a press-specific Charter standard that would make search warrants contingent on certain conditions being satisfied. 20 She would have invalidated these warrants because the police did not show that the evidence being sought from the CBC was unavailable from other sources, or explain why it was necessary to search a member of the press. Justice McLachlin rejected a presumption in favour of law enforcement goals, and stated that the press should only be searched when the warrants explain why access to the evidence is more important than freedom of the press. The CBC search cases are troubling at several levels. In sidelining s.2(b), the Supreme Court took the Charter's explicit guarantee out of the calculus. Despite the celebratory references, the Court's endorsement of a free press was abstract and represented little more than a gesture. The resulting gulf between an abstract conception and a commitment to freedom is reminiscent of the pattern in the 18 La Forest J. wrote of the need to protect newsgathering, because "[t]he press should not be turned into an investigative arm of the state", ibid. at 432, but upheld the warrants on the facts of the cases.
expression cases, where the Court supported the principle of freedom but surrendered it to the concept of reasonable limits under s.1. In this instance, the Court focused on the question of search at the expense of freedom of the press and, in doing so, placed newsgathering at the mercy of s.8's malleable standard of reasonableness. Despite acknowledging the need for vigilance when the press is searched, the Court refused to impose conditions on police access to newsgathering materials. Perhaps most disappointing of all was the Court's suggestion that there is little or no difference between the press and members of the public. In scolding that the CBC ought to be as willing to volunteer its evidence as any citizen the Court missed the point that the press cannot discharge its democratic responsibilities unless it is free from interference from the state and independent in its newsgathering activities. Following the pattern of the jurisprudence, the Court was quick to confirm its commitment to freedom of the press. Both decisions acknowledged the importance of confidential sources, the role they play in 21 Ibid. at 446 (stating that "all members of the community have an interest in seeing that crimes are investigated and prosecuted" and suggesting that "the media might even consider voluntarily delivering their videotapes to the police"). See also New Brunswick, supra, note 12, at 477 (stating that "[t]he media, like any good citizen, should not be unduly opposed to disclosing to the police the evidence they have gathered ...."; emphasis added).
newsgathering, and the vital link between newsgathering and democratic functions. 23 Despite doing so, the Court resisted a press-specific solution under the Charter and claimed, instead, that the general rule of evidence at common law -which recognizes a privilege for confidential relationships in some circumstances -is sufficient to safeguard the constitutional interests at stake.
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The slightly re-modelled common law rule which emerged from these cases may afford confidential newsgathering sources protection in many circumstances. Even so, there are significant differences between a Charter solution, which explicitly constitutionalizes newsgathering and sets a high threshold for the violation of confidential newsgathering relationships, and a common law standard which nudges a generic rule for privilege in a more press-protective direction. It is the difference between a common law regime which places the onus on a journalist to prove that her source should be protected, and a constitutional framework which protects the relationship, and places the burden on anyone seeking disclosure to justify the violation of a confidential relationship pursuant to stringent their experts make a convincing case that unless the media can offer anonymity in situations where sources would otherwise dry-up, freedom of expression in debate on matters of public interest would be badly compromised" and "[i]mportant stories will be left untold, and the transparency and accountability of our public institutions will be compromised to the public detriment").
By suggesting that the press enjoys particular rights and privileges, s.2(b) entrenches a form of exceptionalism. As the newsgathering cases show, the Supreme Court is sympathetic to freedom of the press but uncomfortable with the implications of constitutionalizing those sympathies. At root, the problem in these cases was that the newsgathering activities could not be protected without creating exceptions for the press, or exemptions from the rules that ordinarily apply. The demand for special treatment put the Court on guard because any claim that the press is above the ordinary law conflicts with the rule of law and the primordial principle that all are equal in the eyes of the law. Though s.2(b)'s exceptionalism is grounded in a democratic conception of the press, the Court's skepticism reflects legitimate concerns about the legitimacy of singling this class out for special treatment under the Charter. Absent a theory to bridge that gap, the Court's willingness to treat the press somewhat differently, but not to formalize that difference in constitutional doctrine, is not so surprising.
IV. Open justice: a section 2(b) model
A fair summary of the s.2(b) jurisprudence points to significant victories in some cases, as well as to the Supreme Court's steady recognition of the critical role expressive and press freedom have played in our democratic tradition. Less positively, it had few qualms in discounting freedom principles at the point of decision. As discussed, the Court allowed restrictions on controversial expression by designating the messages as low in value and distant from s.2(b)'s core. Meanwhile, in the context of search warrants and confidential sources, the jurisprudence failed to recognize a constitutional entitlement for the press or to protect newsgathering activities from interference by the state.
One part of the narrative remains to be told, and it concerns the area in which the Court has between public engagement and democratic process that are protected by s.2(b) by emphasizing the "democratic function of public criticism of the courts" and confirming the Court's view that "it is difficult to think of a guaranteed right more important to a democratic society than freedom of expression".
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Having established that the transparency and accountability of the justice system are core values, he turned to the press and tied the newsgathering function to the public interest in access to information about the justice system.
Thus he declared that "[t]he full and fair discussion of public institutions, which is vital to any democracy, is the raison d'être of the s.2(b) guarantee," and added that " [d] ebate in the public domain is predicated on an informed public, which is in turn reliant on a free and vigorous press". 30 He also emphasized that the press cannot inform the public and equip it to discharge its democratic responsibilities without having access to courts and court proceedings. The synergy between the public and press entitlements reached full momentum in his announcement that "freedom of the press not only encompasse[s] the right to report news and other information, but also the right to gather this information". 31 The strength of this principle was re-inforced by the Court's stern admonition that exceptions to open justice must be evidence-based and satisfy a strict standard of justification.
The Supreme Court's commitment to open justice continued to evolve and reached its apex in a case involving the Vancouver Sun, a secret hearing under the post 9/11 terrorism laws, and the Air India 29 Ibid., at paras. 17 and 19 (also stating, at para. 18, that "[t]he freedom of individuals to discuss information about the institutions of government, their policies and practices, is crucial to any notion of democratic rule").
30 Ibid. at para. 23.
31 Ibid. at para. 24. In doing so he relied on his concurring opinion in Lessard, supra, note 12 and its conclusion that "the freedom to disseminate information would be of little value if the freedom under s.2(b) did not also encompass the right to gather news and other information without undue government interference;"(emphasis in original).
trial. 32 There, a reporter discovered by chance that while the Air India trial was taking place in an open courtroom an investigative hearing was being held behind closed doors in another part of the courthouse. Were it not for the fortuity of that discovery, that hearing might have forever remained a secret. Against the compelling interest in investigations aimed at preventing and punishing acts of terrorism, the Supreme Court found the danger of secret judicial proceedings even more threatening, because of their serious implications for the integrity of justice. he freedom of the press to report on judicial proceedings is a core value"; that, "[e]qually, the right of the public to receive information is also protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression"; that " [t] he press plays a vital role in being the conduit through which the public receives that information regarding the operation of public institutions"; and, "[c]onsequently," that "the open court principle, to put it mildly, is not to be lightly interfered with"). Transparency and accountability in the public interest are dominant themes, and help to explain the Court's willingness to support the press and media in this context but not in others.
The same values were also at stake when the press sought protection for newsgathering and investigative reporting practices. There, however, the claims took the form of a demand for special treatment through an exemption from the usual rules for search and a privilege to protect a source by withholding vital information. It seemed, though, that rather than preserve its status as an agent of the public the press was seeking to protect its own interests in these instances. Though a theory could have accommodate limits on freedom. In the case of the press, particular obstacles stand in the way and must be addressed. One is the lack of a theory or set of rationales which speak to the role of the press; realistically, the perception that special treatment and exemptions are the issue will not change until it is established under s.2(b) that the press serves distinctive democratic purposes and has constitutional status for that reason. The second concerns a definition of the press, which has been a challenge before but never more than at the present.
At least in the abstract the Supreme Court has consistently demonstrated that it understands the value of a free press. Despite doing so it has balked when asked to enforce entitlements under s.2(b)'s explicit guarantee. Rather than engage the guarantee, the Court has sidestepped s.2(b) and proclaimed that it is able to accommodate press interests in other ways. In doing so the Court has processed its apprehension about the implications of constitutionalizing newsgathering activities in open and vocal terms. 37 That apprehension makes it incumbent on those who support Charter protection for the press to allay those concerns.
Some preferential or distinctive treatment is necessary to enable the press to discharge its democratic responsibilities. The press function is directly linked to democratic governance because it provides the means for the public to hold government and other sources of power, whether corporate, institutional or individual, up to scrutiny. The kind of transparency that promotes accountability can only be achieved through robust reporting and commentary by a press that operates free from government 37 See e.g., National Post, supra, note 13, at Ibid. at paras. 37-41 (explaining why the constitutional model should be rejected and emphasizing, in particular, that newsgathering could not be constitutionalized on this issue without creating expectations for other techniques -such as checkbook journalism -and claiming that to protect "a heterogeneous and ill-defined group of writers and speakers" would "blow a giant hole in law enforcement and other constitutionally recognized values such as privacy"; ibid. at para. 40).
interference and functions independent of the state. This function is distinctive and institutional in nature, and cannot be served unless newsgathering is free from interference by the state. The constitutional status of the press is grounded in a function that recognizes transparency and accountability as core principles of our democratic tradition, and looks to the press as an agent of the public in preserving and protecting those values.
To its credit the Court had no difficulty with this concept on openness questions, but did not respond the same way in the newsgathering cases. There, it failed to grasp the need for the press to be scrupulously independent from the state in its newsgathering function. Co-opting the press as an arm of the government in the investigation of crimes undermines its authority as an investigative institution in its own right. To discharge its own democratic responsibilities the press must have control over its newsgathering material; its capacity for reporting in the public interest will otherwise be compromised.
Along similar lines, investigative reporting depends on access to confidential sources; although the Court recognized the role of sources and acknowledged that journalists must be able to protect their sources, it failed to grasp in systemic terms that compelling a journalist to disclose a source -including the threat of forcing disclosure -fundamentally undermines the newsgathering function.
The integrity of the newsgathering process must be recognized and protected by the Charter.
Rather than address the issue through s.8 or the common law, the focus should be on s.2(b) and should take the form of a presumption against interference with newsgathering. A principled approach would require judges to find a violation of s.2(b) when a search warrant is issued or disclosure of a confidential source is sought and to set a high evidentiary threshold of justification for any derogation from freedom of the press. It is simply a matter of adopting the open justice methodology and applying it to these issues. Under this approach derogations would be permissible under s.1, but only under a standard for reasonable limits that is designed to protect press freedom. This approach would grant newsgathering constitutional status and restrict interferences to exceptional circumstances where a compelling case for access to newsgathering materials has been made.
A second problem concerns the press itself, and the way technology has democratized the gathering, dissemination and sharing of information. Defining the press was not a significant issue in the first thirty years of the Charter when the institutional press was actively engaged in much of the s.2(b)
jurisprudence. Conventional conceptions of the press have been destabilized in recent years by transformative technological change. This change has eroded the boundary between the institutional press and journalism professionals, and an undifferentiated group who may exercise their right of expressive freedom in ways that overlap with, mimic, or claim to engage a press function. Yet there are consequences for s.2(b) if newsgathering and the dissemination of news are no longer the exclusive precinct of the institutional press. In such circumstances, the question that demands urgent attention is whether a constitutional concept of the press is sustainable at this point in time, or must give way -in the face of technology's equalizing consequences -and fold press interests into the general guarantee of expressive freedom. To avoid that prospect it is incumbent, once again, on those who seek constitutional status for the press to make the case for an independent Charter guarantee that stands apart from, and is protected in different ways than, expressive freedom.
To survive and claim its own space under the Charter and shift the narrative at the Charter's next checkpoint, the press guarantee must meet this challenge: to avoid being collapsed into expressive freedom, s.2(b)'s other fundamental freedom must accommodate technological change in a way that preserves continuity with the democratic purposes and responsibilities of a free press.
